'98 Year in Review: Regulation — EPA and OSHA

As the Environmental Protection Agency looked under the hood and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration got closer to climbing into the cab, the trucking industry fended off increased federal regulatory supervision on two fronts in 1998.

With the year just six days old, a group of state air quality officials sent a letter to the EPA asking it to look into claims that the manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines were cheating on federal emissions tests. The group charged the engines’ electronic emissions controls were designed to pass federal tests, but maximized fuel economy and polluted at much higher levels under normal operating conditions (2-2, p. 1).

In response, the EPA started issuing only temporary certificates of conformity for the engines of six companies: Caterpillar Inc., Cummins Engine Co., Detroit Diesel Corp., Mack Trucks, Navistar International Transportation Corp. and Volvo Truck Corp., who together account for 95% of the heavy-duty diesel engines sold in the United States.

Talks continued and after a brief interlude where Mack and EPA traded lawsuits over the matter (6-22, p. 1), culminated with an Oct. 26 settlement announcement.



All six engines manufacturers signed similar consent decrees to put the matter behind them. They agreed to pay record fines, fund environmental projects, meet tougher emissions standards and rebuild engines already on the road. The total costs of the settlement are expected to exceed $1 billion.

However, the engine makers admitted no wrongdoing in signing the agreement. In fact, manufacturers continued to deny cheating on emissions tests or having ever been out of compliance. They claimed that the EPA knew about and condoned the methods used to meet emissions standards for years and that the problem was with the federal test procedure, which failed to take into account real-life conditions.

Later, Volvo backed up those claims with documents from a 1994 meeting at which the EPA was told about the problems with its tests (11-23, p. 1).

The EPA acknowledged receiving that information in 1994. However, it said an investigation could not find further evidence to support widespread abuse of emissions standards until 1997 (12-28, p. 1). EPA denied that engine makers had told it of the testing modifications, noting that those strategies constituted defeat devices prohibited under the Clean Air Act.

What remains to be seen in the coming years is how the commitments made by engine makers to placate EPA will effect fuel economy and performance, and how that will affect trucking companies bottom lines.

Another federal agency encroaching on bottom lines in 1998 was OSHA.

Its cooperative compliance program would have given certain employers the choice between getting a mandatory inspection or volunteering for a special program. The latter option included handing over records and setting up extensive safety and health programs that aren’t otherwise required by the agency (1-5, p. 1).

The U.S. Chamber of Congress, the American Trucking Associations and other industry groups questioned how “voluntary” such a program could be. They sued OSHA and won a court injunction of the program (2-2, p. 5). A federal court heard oral arguments on the lawsuit in December and a ruling is expected early this year (12-7, p. 45).

OSHA also continued to try and tackle the issue of ergonomics. The agency is now developing its proposal and hopes to reveal it in September.

The trucking industry has fought the agency every step of the way in its attempts to write an ergonomics standard for fear that the cab vibrations, handling and other factors involved in driving a truck would be covered.

Many industry groups, including ATA, have argued not enough scientific data exist to write an effective ergonomics regulation. OSHA got a boost in this area in October when the National Academy of Sciences released the results of a two-day workshop it conducted on ergonomics (10-12, p. 1). The report linked workplace activity with musculoskeletal disorders and said that “specific interventions” can reduce such medical problems in workers who perform high-risk tasks. Critics charged that the report was bias and did not answer some of the key questions surrounding the issue such as how non-work factors contribute to injuries and what level of exposure to ergonomic hazards is too much.

For the full story, see the Jan. 11 print edition of Transport Topics. Subscribe today.